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Abstract
Although my work is largely with international lawyers, I often meet lawyers from many
walks of life and am struck by how many lawyers seem to doubt the very existence of international
law. Layman though I am, I want to lay that misconception to rest. Law is the warp and woof of
the fabric that binds us together. Law makes it possible for one hundred and fifty-four nations to
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Good lawyers are good problem solvers. They assist me in
using the law to structure and guide our positions. At this level
they give truth to Samuel Johnson's great compliment that "[t]he
law is the last result of human wisdom acting upon human experi-
ence for the benefit of the public."' Dr. Johnson spoke of course of
domestic law, but his words apply equally to international law as
well.
That brings me to my second observation about lawyers. Al-
though my work is largely with international lawyers, I often meet
lawyers from many walks of life and am struck by how many law-
yers seem to doubt the very existence of international law. Layman
though I am, I want to lay that misconception to rest.
Contemporary international relations would be impossible
without the very extensive body of law that governs the daily con-
duct of nations. Absent that law, international mail would not
move; planes would not fly safely; shortwave radio would be a
hopeless jumble of conflicting and overlapping signals; and there
would be no basis for world-wide efforts to control infectious dis-
eases, as there was when the World Health Organization successfully
eliminated smallpox.
* Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. B.S.,
1957, Illinois State University; M.S., 1959, Southern Illinois University.
1. H. PIozzi, ANECDOTES OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 73 (1925).
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Law is the warp and woof of the fabric that binds us together.
Law makes it possible for one hundred and fifty-four nations to
deal cooperatively and peacefully with each other over a wide
range of issues. By treaty, bv development of customary law, and
by judicial decision, the world has evolved and continues to evolve
legal norms to facilitate international intercourse and solve interna-
tional problems. A burgeoning code of international law by treaty
demonstrates that the world communitv is capable of timely re-
sponse to contemporary needs. The thirty-fourth session of the
United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages. 2 In 1967, the General Assem-
bly approved the Outer Space Treaty which would place space be-
yond national sovereignty and stop the arms race in space before it
could begin. 3
In the 1960's the problem of aircraft hijacking became a source
of concern for the entire international community. Between 1963
and 1971, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, three multilateral treaties were concluded to com-
bat various aspects of air piracy by providing for criminalization of
offenses, mutual assistance and prosecution or extradition of offend-
ers. 4 As a result, there was a marked decline in what had become
an almost commonplace occurrence. The conventions established
an international norm of behavior for states. In recent days, we
have seen a reoccurrence of this phenomenon in terms of Cuban
"refugees' seeking to return. It is important to note, however, that
Cuba itself, although not a party to the multilateral treaties, has
complied with the international norm by jailing and in one instance
2. International Convention Against Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34-146
adopted Dec. 17, 1979, reprinted in 1979 U.N.Y.B. _.
3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed Jan.
27, 1967, and entered into force Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205.
4. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft (Tokyo Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704
U.N.T.S. 219, reprinted in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1042 (1963); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 133 (1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,




returning offenders for trial in the United States. 5 By returning of-
fenders for trial here, the Cubans have helped send a message that
such acts cannot be tolerated.
The monumental effort to formulate a comprehensive Law of
the Sea, 6 which will govern the rights and duties of states in the ex-
ploitation of three-quarters of the earth's surface, is widely per-
ceived as second only to the drafting of the United Nations Charter
as an elaboration of fundamental rules of behavior in a vital area.
And under the leadership of Ambassador Eliot Richardson, major
progress has been made in resolving the immense number of issues
involved in the Law of the Sea Conference.
All of these areas touch the lives of each and every one of us.
The on-going debate about the extraterritorial reach of United
States' safety, health and environmental standards is a complex of
international political and legal developments. These developments,
along with human rights litigation in United States courts on behalf
of foreign nationals 7 and civil damage suits pending against the
Iranian Government by some of the Americans previously held
hostage, 8 all cut across the imaginary line between international law
and the daily legal practice of an American practitioner.
International law also touches the private practitioner in the
field of international trade law. Professor Joseph C. Sweeney of
Fordham University School of Law is a vital part of our team for
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law which
has done admirable work in harmonizing and simplifying the law of
international trade. 9
5. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1980, at Al, col. 6.
6. The Third Law of the Sea Conference produced a draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea which will be presented to the UN General Assembly during the
Spring 1981 session. The draft is reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1129 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); 4 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 213 (1980); Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International Torture, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 44; Foreign Victims Find U.S. Forums, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
8. Suits against the Government of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the
militant students holding the embassy were filed on behalf of two hostages and eight
other persons stationed at the embassy. The wife of the imprisoned State Depart-
ment communications officer filed suit in the Federal District Court in South
Carolina seeking $1 billion in punitive damages. The aggregate of damages sought
by all plaintiffs equals $1.356 billion, to be satisfied out of the $8 billion in blocked
Iranian assets. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1980, at All, col. 1.
9. See U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI),
adopted unanimously Dec. 17, 1966, reprinted in 1966 U.N.Y.B. 920-21.
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I am aware of the positivist response which seeks to ignore the
very substantial body of law to which I have already referred by as-
serting that in some way international law is unenforceable. The
fact is that the overwhelming body of international law is rigorously
followed every day by all states. There are some violations, how-
ever, and when they occur there is not necessarily an assured
means of insisting on the observance of international law to the
same extent that there is, or that we like to think there is, in our do-
mestic law. This is not to say that there are no sanctions. In the
first place, the breach of an obligation by a party may give rise to
the right on the part of other parties to terminate the relationship.
This is normally sanction enough. There are, moreover, legal en-
forcement mechanisms in the UN Charter that are invoked in re-
sponse to certain violations of international law.' 0 The imposition of
sanctions against Rhodesia during its fourteen year rebellion was a
case in point. Those sanctions did not bring Rhodesia's rebellion to
an immediate end, but without those sanctions there would prob-
ably be no Zimbabwe today." Furthermore, there are political sanc-
tions available to penalize those who violate the law. Today many
nations are increasingly willing to exert their political will singu-
larly or jointly in order to condemn breaches of international law.
The international community's attitude toward the Soviet Union in
the post Afghanistan invasion period is one such example on which
I shall speak later.
We are here today to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniver-
sary of one of the great centers of learning. As we think back to
1905 when Fordham Law School was founded, we think back to an
era of hope and optimism, an era in which the world believed that
progress based on global stability could solve all problems. Much
of that optimism came crashing down in the blood bath of World
War I. It became apparent that the political stability on which
hope was based was false and untenable. The intervening sixty
years have seen repeated efforts by the international community to
organize itself in a better way. The first such effort, the League of
Nations, failed in part because of American non-participation. In
1945 we saw the launching of another great effort to build political
institutions which could provide the stability on which progress for
10. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
11. See generally Comment, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J.
887, 896 nn.42-45 (1978). Zimbabwe entered the United Nations on Aug. 25, 1980.
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all can be based. The judgment is not in yet on these efforts. All
we can say for sure is that at the age of thirty-five the United Na-
tions remains a dynamic institution reflecting global realities and a
place where people can come together to seek common solutions. We
can also say that the stakes have become much greater. In 190.5 or
1920 the belief that progress could alleviate the sufferings of the
many was only an act of faith. In 1914 and even in 1939 our capac-
ity for self-destruction was appalling, but limited. Today, our ca-
pacity for self-destruction is total. We must recall the faith in man
and progress of that earlier era, build on the experience of the
intervening seventy-five years and never lose sight of what is at
stake should we fail.
Our search for a new stability will depend in large measure on
how we handle nationalism. The process is complex and we must
not be distracted by passing phenomena. One of the most interest-
ing things that happened after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
was the discovery by the American press of a new, anti-Soviet ma-
jority at the United Nations. The Soviets suffered an overwhelming
defeat when the General Assemblv called for the withdrawal of
Russian troops from Afghanistan. 12 That defeat was the kind of politi-
cal sanction for the violation of law to which I earlier referred. The
defeat of Cuba's bid for a Security Council seat was a related politi-
cal sanction. Yet even these reactions must be seen in context. At
the time, several respected columnists proclaimed that the mem-
bers of the nonaligned group had finally seen the light about the
Russians. The writers predicted that these countries had, or soon
would, shift their allegiance fror East to West. There was a partic-
ular irony about these predictions. Only a few weeks before they
appeared, the same press corps was decrying the Third World's
consistent anti-American stand. The New York Times Magazine
had just published an article entitled How the Third World Runs
the U.N. 13 The article was reminiscent of the speeches about the
"Tyranny of the Majority" that one of my predecessors used to de-
liver when he represented our country at what he later called "a
very dangerous place.' 14 Its premise was that the newest members
12. G.A. Res. A/RES/ES-6/2, Jan. 14, 1980, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 73
(Feb. 1980). The General Assembly recently repeated its call for the Soviet Union to
withdraw its troops. The tone, however, was softer. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1980, at Al,
col. 2.
13. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 6 (magazine), at 36-37.
14. See D. MOYNIHAN, A DANGEROUS PLACE (1978).
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of the United Nations were using the organization to "achieve ob-
jectives that threaten American interests and challenge American
power. "15
I never shared the view that there was an automatic anti-
American majority at the United Nations. But neither is there a
new anti-Soviet majority. Both of these positions reflect an Ameri-
can tendencv to see everything that happens in the world in the
context of East-West confrontation. This tendency prevents us from
understanding the political underpinnings of the nonaligned move-
ment, and hinders effective dealings between the United States
and the Third World.
For the past three decades, the most massive, far-reaching
revolution in all of history has been taking place in the Third
World. I am, of course, referring to the dismemberment of the
world's colonial empires, the birth of almost one hundred inde-
pendent nations, and the rise of Third World nationalism.
The United States helped plant the seeds of this revolution by
insisting that the United Nations Charter endorse the right of all
people to self-determination.16 We could have done nothing else
without being a traitor to our history and our raison d'etre. Yet we
do not seem fully ready to accept the logical consequences of that
revolution. As a result of the emergence of strong nationalistic sen-
timent in the Third World, it is necessary for Americans to revise
their conception of the international power structure and the rea-
sons behind many current trends and events. We have to reassess
what it means when on occasion we find ourselves in the minority,
and on occasion the Soviets in the majority, on certain highly pub-
licized issues that arise in the United Nations and other global
forums.
The world that emerged from the chaos of World War II was
bipolar, dominated by the two superpowers and the alliances that
grew up around them. Much of the rest of the world was still un-
der colonial adiniistration. As nations came into being, they were
denominated "pro-American" or "pro-Soviet" depending on whether
they were perceived as more closely aligned with one bloc or the
other.
In the 1950's, three Third World leaders-Marshall Tito of
Yugoslavia, President Nasser of Egypt, and Prime Minister Nehru
15. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 6 (magazine), at 37.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, cl. 2.
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of India-began to question whether the interests of developing
countries were well served by identifying them with one camp or
the other. These leaders felt that progress on matters of great im-
portance to developing countries, such as economic development,
would always take a back seat to superpower politics within the
rigid bipolar structure of the post-war world. Thus these Third
World leaders announced that they would separate themselves
from both superpower blocs and pursue their own interests in-
dependently-accepting political support and practical assistance
wherever they might find it in the developed world. That was the
genesis of the nonaligned movement, and that remains its premise.
The nonaligned group now has over one hundred and twenty
members. It is not monolithic. It consists of large and small states,
with various levels of resources, at various stages of development.
Some are hardly nonaligned. Some of its members are extremely
poor; others are extremely rich. On many international questions,
their views and votes diverge widely. The adhesive that binds this
nonaligned group together is a common position on the three is-
sues that form the priority agenda of Third World concerns. These
issues are: 1) the end of colonialism and racism; 2) self-deter-
mination for all people, including the Palestinians and South Afri-
can Blacks; and 3) realignment of the global economy to ensure a
more fair allocation of resources to all nations.
To recite the Third World's priority agenda is to understand
why it sometimes seems to Americans that the nonaligned group is
not truly nonaligned. On certain highly publicized issues-
Southern Africa, the Middle East, and international economic
reform-the Third World and Western states espouse different
points of view, and the Soviet Bloc lines up behind the Third
World. This is hardly a coincidence. On every one of these issues,
the United States and other Western nations have important inter-
ests at stake-strategic interests and economic investment in many
areas and moral commitments to Israel in the Middle East. We
must always weigh those interests in the balance when voting on
these questions where Third World passions run high.
The Soviet Union, by contrast, has little or nothing of strategic
or economic value invested in the developing countries. It there-
fore has nothing to lose by aligning itself against us on major Third
World issues. Nonetheless, the United Nations is not run by a
voting trust consisting of the Eastern bloc and the Third World.
Recent events clearly demonstrate that the vaunted alliance be-
1980l
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tween the Russians and the nonaligned movement simply does not
exist. Last year, for example, the Third World specifically rebuffed
overtures to formalize any relationship between itself and the So-
viet Bloc. At the Nonaligned Conference in Havana, member-na-
tions refused to adopt a resolution advocated by Cuba that would
have recognized the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites as
the "natural allies" of the Third World.
The nonaligned states, moreover, have not shied away from
opposing Soviet positions when they perceived their interests to be
at stake. They joined the United States in condemning the invasion
of Kampuchea by the Soviet-backed government of Vietnam, and,
like us, they have refused to recognize the regime installed there
by the Vietnamese. They are increasingly critical of Soviet protes-
tations that the Eastern bloc states have no obligation to contribute
more than verbal support to Third World development. Even be-
fore the invasion of Afghanistan, a significant number of nonaligned
states refused to support Cuba's candidacy for a seat on the United
Nations Security Council. They were concerned that Cuba, despite
its position as head of the nonaligned movement, would not pro-
mote truly nonaligned positions. Cuba's refusal to condemn the in-
vasion led to loss of support from already suspicious countries,
forced Cuba to withdraw its candidacy, and severely undermined
Cuba's influence in the nonaligned movement.17
If it is wrong to assume that Soviet solidarity with the Third
World on many issues implies a nonaligned tilt to the East, it is
equally erroneous to view the lopsided General Assembly vote on
Afghanistan, or the earlier vote on Kampuchea as harbingers of a
Third-World/Western bloc alliance. Without question, the Afghan
incident has had a profound effect on Third World thinking. The
preeminent concern in the Third World is that every nation re-
spect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all others. Most of
the nonaligned are former colonies. They are deeply suspicious of
any threat to their independence. Russian tanks on nonaligned ter-
ritory represent a challenge to the principles which the nonaligned
hold most dearly. These concerns, however, have not expanded
the Western Bloc by eighty-five or ninety members. Rather, they
have led to expressions of Third World nationalism that happen to
coincide with our own national interests.
The nonaligned nations are as much wedded to the principle
17. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1980, at A4, col. 3-4.
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of independence from either bloc now as they ever were. They will
continue to vote in light of what they perceive are their interests,
without regard to the impact their votes will have on superpower
politics. As the Third World has not abandoned the principle of
nonalignment, we can expect the members of the nonaligned bloc
to continue to vote differently than we do on all the issues on
which our interests have heretofore diverged.
The Afghan invasion, for example, will not cause the Third
World states to abandon their quest for a full economic boycott of
South Africa as a protest against apartheid. Although American and
British efforts to find peaceful paths of independence for the peo-
ple of Zimbabwe and Namibia are much appreciated by the Third
World, particularly the Africans, the developing states will con-
tinue to object to our relations with the South African Govern-
ment, and particularly our continuing trade relations with that
country. Neither will the nonaligned abandon their campaign
against Israel over the Palestinian question. The United States can-
not and will not accept the Third World's characterization of Zion-
ism as racism, or of the Arab-Israeli dispute as a colonial issue, or
the denunciation by some of the Camp David accords and the
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. 18 Thus, we are likely to remain at
loggerheads on these questions for quite some time, even if the
Palestinian autonomy talks are successful.
The developing nations resent the role they believe they were
programmed to play when the Western powers created the postwar
international economic order. They see themselves as locked into an
unenviable position. On the one hand, they produce raw materials
for which they are paid low prices that fluctuate widely with cyc-
lical reactions in the developed world. On the other hand, they are
purchasers of manufactured goods, the cost of which continues to
rise, without correlation to the cost of raw materials. Third World
countries want to break out of that pattern and use their resources
to become exporters of the manufactured goods and to command
better prices for their raw materials. Since they cannot find a way
to change their position in the context of the existing global
economy, they want to change the rules. Thus, the Third World's
call for a "new international economic order" to replace the one set
18. Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, March 26, 1979, __ U.N.T.S.
I reprinted in Documents Pertaining to the Conclusion of Peace (Embassy of
Israel: Washington, D.C.) (1979); N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1979, at A14-16.
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up when most of the nonaligned were still colonies will occupy
center stage at the United Nations for the next few years. These
are not East-West issues on which the nonaligned are lining up
with the Soviet Union against the United States. They are Third
World issues on which the Soviets take a pro-Third World position,
because they have nothing to lose by doing so, and because they
wish to be on the winning side of a popular cause. More and more,
however, Soviet interests will conflict with the principles espoused
by the nonaligned-as they did in Afghanistan and Kampuchea,
and as they do whenever the Soviet Union is asked to contribute
more than rhetorical support to Third World development. When
that happens, the Soviets will vote according to their own inter-
ests, and we will side with the majority.
Americans should not conclude that the United States has no
voice in the United Nations, or that it and similar organizations are
inimical to our interests, simply because we are on the losing side
of these votes. The United States does not want the Third World
nations to become client states that will support our positions sim-
ply because they are American, or that oppose Soviet viewpoints
for the sake of voting against the Russians. Whatever our differ-
ences on these issues, we should at least respect the nationalistic
impulses among the nonaligned that contribute to the positions
they take.
Our vision of the United Nations, and the judgment we pass
upon it, must be more sophisticated. Ideally, the United Nations
should provide a forum in which cooperation and moral suasion can
prevail to defuse volatile situations. The ideal is only attainable if
nations take positions on issues on the basis of careful analysis of
the principles involved. There should be no room at the United
Nations for knee jerk reactions and votes based on preconceptions
set in concrete, whether those preconceptions are pro-American,
pro-Soviet or pro-Third World. Judged against this standard, the
United Nations can still be found wanting.
The Third World cast its vote on Afghanistan based on princi-
ple, and our interests were served in the process. It has happened
before-witness Iran and Kampuchea. It happens over and over
again. Indeed, we are on the winning side of United Nations' votes
more often than we are losers, largely because we are more princi-
pled in our positions than the Soviets. Against such a standard it is




What I hope is developing and what we must strive to develop
is a stable international society. The emergence of the Third World
is our best hope for stability. Stability cannot be based only on the
balance of power among the few, for history has shown us that such
stability is short lived. What we have now, at last, is the possibility
of international stability based on the interest and participation of
all. Not the stability of a brokered deal among the few which fails if
any party to it has a whim, but a stability so broad in its base that
it cannot fail. It is to that end we must labor. As we come to un-
derstand the nature, hopes and aspirations of the Third World, we
shall see more clearly the road to that broad-based stability. On
that political stability we can deliver for ourselves and others on
the hopes that existed in 1905 and which can, in the next seventy-
five years, become the reality of an interdependent world. I do not
say we are certain to succeed, or that we can drop our guard
against those who would wish us ill. If we remain strong and main-
tain our vision, the United States has a major role to play in mov-
ing toward that world. Let us hope that we make it-well before
the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Fordham Law School.
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